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IntroductIon
On June 21, 2010, in the run-up to the G-20 meeting in 
Toronto,  China  announced  that  it  would  shift  to  a  more 
flexible exchange rate policy. From mid-June to July 30 the 
yuan  rose  0.8  percent  against  the  dollar.  In  contrast,  the 
currency had remained fixed (at about 6.83 yuan to the dollar) 
from September 2008 to early June 2010. Pressure not only 
from  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union  but  also 
from Russia, Brazil, and India as well as the IMF seems likely 
to have played a role in China’s decision, although concerns 
about domestic inflation may also have been a factor. 
An undervalued renminbi is widely considered to have 
contributed  to  large  Chinese  current  account  surpluses  in 
recent years and, correspondingly, to large US current account 
deficits. China had previously moved in mid-2005 to allow its 
exchange rate to appreciate, and from June 2005 to August 
2008 the currency rose by 18.6 percent in real effective (trade-
weighted) terms (IMF 2010a). But then the intensification 
of the financial crisis in the United States prompted Chinese 
authorities to freeze the currency against the dollar once again, 
in pursuit of greater stability in the face of greater interna-
tional uncertainty. Nonetheless, the safe-haven effect boosted 
the dollar and hence pushed up the renminbi still further, 
and when the dollar peaked in March 2009 the real effective 
exchange rate of the renminbi stood 25.8 percent above its 
June 2005 level. It is shown in this policy brief that this strong 
increase contributed importantly to the reduction of China’s 
current account surplus from its peak of 11 percent of GDP 
in 2007 to less than 6 percent by 2009 (although the global 
recession also influenced the 2009 outcome). 
The easing in the global financial crisis beginning in April 
2009 and the subsequent unwinding of the safe-haven effect 
brought an easing of the dollar and hence the renminbi, and 
by year-end 2009 the real effective rate of the renminbi was 
back down to 17 percent above the June 2005 level. With 
even the 2009 current account excessive by most standards 
(Cline and Williamson 2010), the fixed rate against the dollar 
had once again placed China in the prospective position of 
aggravating rather than helping reduce global imbalances. The 
return to flexibility in June 2010 gives China the scope to 
contribute further to international adjustment of imbalances, 
but whether it does so will depend on whether the authorities 
allow the yuan to rise at a sustained pace that is comparable 
to or greater than that observed in the previous period of flex-
ibility (June 2005 through August 2008).
Against  the  US  dollar,  during  the  period  of  flexibility 
the  yuan  rose  by  21  percent  from  June  2005  to  August 
2008. Skeptics argue that because the US trade deficit with 
China did not decline during this period, appreciation of the 
yuan is not an effective remedy for China’s surpluses or for   
US  deficits.  As  just  indicated,  this  note  presents  evidence 
showing instead that the strength of the renminbi does affect 
China’s external balance. Moreover, it will be shown that the 
strength of the renminbi also affects the bilateral trade balance 
with the United States. So although for policy purposes it 
is the global balances for both the United States and China 
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rather than their bilateral balance that should matter, both 
China’s  global  balance  and  its  bilateral  balance  against  the 
United States are clearly influenced by the strength of the 
renminbi, both on an effective basis and bilaterally against the 
US dollar.
Impact of the renmInbI on chIna’s 
external surplus
Figure  1  shows  the  Chinese  current  account  surplus  as  a 
percent  of  GDP  (ca),  the  excess  of  China’s  GDP  growth 
rate over the world growth rate (gc-gw), and (on the right-
hand side) the IMF’s index of the real effective exchange rate 
(REER), which has a base of 100 in 2005.1 The exchange rate 
variable (REERL) is lagged, and equals the average of the level 
in the two previous years (so that, for example, the figure 
shows the index average for 2008–09 in the “2010” position). 
The lag reflects the time it takes for the exchange rate signal 
to be interpreted as more than a temporary fluctuation, and 
the  additional  time  for  resulting  production  decisions  and 
trade  flows  to  materialize.  A  relatively  strong  renminbi  in 
2001–02 (index at about 111) was associated with a moderate 
current account surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP by 2003. Then 
following a period of weakness in the renminbi as the currency 
“rode the dollar down” in 2002–05, by 2005–06 the index 
stood at an average of only 101, contributing to a surge of 
the surplus to a peak of 11 percent of GDP in 2007. The 
subsequent decline of the surplus to 5.8 percent of GDP in 
2009 and a similar level in 2010 coincides with the lag to 
a new phase of a stronger renminbi (from the appreciation 
against the dollar in 2005–08 plus “riding the dollar up” as 
the safe-haven effect boosted the dollar from 2008 to 2009).2 
Rapid  growth  in  China  boosts  domestic  demand,  and 
growth performance in the rest of the world affects export 
demand, so China’s external balance has also responded to the 
difference between domestic and foreign growth. As shown 
in  the  figure,  this  difference  peaked  in  2009  when  China 
achieved growth of 9.1 percent but worldwide growth fell to 
–2 percent in the “Great Recession.” 
1. Data are from IMF (2010a and 2010b) except as noted below.
2. For 2010, the current account estimate at 5.3 percent of GDP is the average 
of the IMF (2010b), World Bank Beijing (2010), and private sector forecasts 
(Blue Chip 2010). China’s GDP in dollars is calculated at $4.909 trillion for 
2009 (IMF 2010a) and $5.64 trillion for 2010. The latter estimate is based on 
9.5 percent real growth, consumer price index (CPI) inflation of 3.7 percent 
(both from World Bank Beijing 2010), a corresponding estimate of 4 percent 
increase in the GDP deflator (which rose faster than the CPI in 2003–08; 
IMF 2010a), and an average exchange rate of 6.78 yuan per dollar. Note that 
estimated growth in 2009 was revised upward by the Chinese government in 
mid-2010, from 8.7 percent to 9.1 percent.
A statistical test confirms that China’s current account 
surplus responds to the real exchange rate and the growth 
differential. Using the same data as shown in figure 1, the 
following relationship can be estimated:
(1) ca = 46.7 – 0.416 REERL –0.155 (gc – gw) + 0.785 T; 
                  (5.9)   (–6.1)             (–0.6)               (5.6)
adj. R2 = 0.89
where ca is the current account surplus as a percent of GDP, 
REERL is the lagged real effective exchange rate, gc is China’s 
growth rate, gw is world growth, T is a time trend variable 
(=1  for  2000  through  11  for  2010),  and  t-statistics  are  in 
parentheses. The coefficients for the exchange rate and the time 
trend are highly significant in statistical terms. The coefficient 
on the real effective exchange rate indicates that a 1 percent 
rise in the renminbi yields a 0.45 percent of GDP fall in the 
current account, or by $25 billion at China’s 2010 economic 
scale.3 This impact is larger than the corresponding estimate of 
0.30 (presently corresponding to $17 billion) used for China 
in the multilateral equilibrium exchange rate model of Cline 
(2008). 
The implied export price elasticity in this result is relatively 
high. As argued in Cline (2005 and 2008), current account 
changes relative to GDP as a consequence of currency adjust-
3. The average exchange rate index for the sample period is 107.7, so an 
increase of 1 percent is a rise of 1.077 units of REERL, and 1.077 x (−0.416) 
= − 0.45.
Figure 1     China’s current account surplus, growth 
  rate relative to world growth, and lagged 
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ment tend to be driven by export changes, because volume 
changes in imports tend to be neutralized by changes in the 
domestic currency value of the foreign currency.4 With exports 
of goods and services at about 35 percent of GDP in 2006–08 
(IMF 2010a), the coefficient of −0.45 percent of GDP change 
in current account for a 1 percent real effective appreciation 
implies  an  export  price  elasticity  of  −1.29  (=  −0.45/0.35), 
higher  than  the  elasticity  of  unity  used  in  estimating  the 
current account impact parameter for China in Cline (2008). 
A recent empirical study at the US Federal Reserve finds even 
higher price elasticities for China’s exports.5
The  coefficient  on  domestic  growth  minus  foreign 
growth has the correct sign but is not statistically significant. 
It indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the 
growth differential reduces the surplus by 0.155 percent of 
GDP.  If  instead  the  income  elasticity  were  unity  for  both 
imports and exports, then considering the share of trade in 
GDP this coefficient would be expected to be −0.33 instead of 
−0.155, so the coefficient is probably understated.6
The coefficient on the time trend means that there is a 
strong upward drift in China’s current account surplus over 
time, at a pace of about 0.8 percentage point of GDP per year. 
Taken together, the exchange rate and time-trend coefficients 
imply that it would require an effective appreciation at a pace 
of 1.7 percent per year to keep the current account surplus 
4. If the price elasticity of imports is unity, appreciation of the exchange rate 
causes an increase in the quantity of imports demanded that is exactly offset, 
in local currency values, by the decline in local currency paid for each unit of 
foreign currency.
5. Ahmed (2009) finds an export price elasticity of –1.9 for non-processing 
exports and –1.5 even for exports of good processed using imported inputs 
(p. 23). The study’s simulation exercise finds that if the real effective exchange 
rate had risen cumulatively by 18 percent above its actual path from 2005:3 to 
2009:2, real exports by mid-2009 would have been 30 percent lower (p. 30), 
implying an overall effective price elasticity for exports of –1.67.
6. In 2008, exports of goods and services stood at 36.6 percent of GDP, and 
imports of goods and services at 28.4 percent (IMF 2010a). With an income 
elasticity of unity on both sides, a reduction in foreign growth by 0.5 percent 
and increase in domestic growth by 0.5 percent would reduce exports by 
0.183 percent of GDP and raise imports by 0.142 percent of GDP, for a total 
reduction in the trade surplus by 0.325 percent of GDP.
from rising relative to GDP.7 This finding is consistent with 
the observation of Goldstein and Lardy (2009, pp. 10, 24) 
that there is a differential productivity growth rate of about 
3 percent per year between China and its trading partners, 
and the diagnosis by Mussa (2008, p. 285) that “the long-run 
equilibrium path for China’s real exchange rate has a moderate 
upward tilt of about 2 percent per year.” The broader tradition 
underlying such a view is the Balassa-Samuelson effect whereby 
there is a secular rise in the real effective exchange rate of a 
rapidly  growing  developing  economy  as  a  consequence  of 
more rapid productivity growth in its tradable goods sector 
than in its non-traded sector.
The evidence here supports the view that the real effective 
exchange rate influences the current account balance in the 
expected way. Special stories about how the textbook relation-
ship does not apply to China (for example, because reliance 
of  Chinese  exports  on  imported  inputs  nullifies  exchange 
rate effects, or because multinationals ignore exchange rates 
in sourcing decisions) are rejected by the results here (and in 
other recent studies such as Ahmed 2009).
Impact of the renmInbI on the  
us external defIcIt
What about the influence on the US external accounts? The 
most straightforward way to calculate the impact of renminbi 
appreciation  on  the  US  external  deficit  is  to  consider  the 
weight of China in US trade, calculate the decline in the US 
trade-weighted REER when the renminbi rises, and apply the 
usual relationship between the US REER and the US current 
account balance. Cline (2008) identifies a parameter of –0.16 
for the change in the US current account balance as a percent 
of GDP for each percent increase in the US REER. China 
has a weight of 9.1 percent in the US REER (p. 24).8 So a 
10 percent appreciation of the renminbi causes a 0.91 percent 
depreciation  of  the  US  REER.  That  depreciation  in  turn 
causes a 0.91 x 0.16 = 0.14 percent of GDP improvement 
in the US current account balance, or a reduction by about 
$22 billion in the US current account deficit when applied to 
present GDP. As discussed below, the effect is greater if other 
regional economies follow China and appreciate their curren-
cies against the dollar as well.
An alternative, indirect way to calculate the impact on 
US external accounts is to consider the expected share of the 
United  States  in  the  counterpart  of  the  change  in  China’s 
7. That is: 0.785/0.45 = 1.74.
8. This share is the ratio of bilateral exports plus imports to total US exports 
plus imports for 2006.
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external  balance  as  a  consequence  of  appreciation  of  the 
renminbi. The United States represents about 15 percent of 
China’s trade (Cline, 2008, p. 25). If the estimate of equation 
1  is  applied  as  the  basis  for  calculating  China’s  change  in 
current account, a 10 percent real effective appreciation of 
the renminbi causes a 4.5 percent of (China’s) GDP reduction 
in  the  current  account  surplus.  Against  the  2010  GDP  of   
$5.6 trillion, the result is an increase in the US trade balance 
by $38 billion (= 4.5 percent x $5.6 trillion x 0.15), out of a 
total $250 billion adjustment for China. This indirect calcula-
tion is higher than the direct one primarily because the impact 
estimate in equation 1 here is larger than the corresponding 
estimate in the model in Cline (2008).
Skeptics would argue that the evidence does not support 
such  model  calculations  because  the  bilateral  US-China 
imbalance did not improve from 2005 to 2008 despite the rise 
in the renminbi. It is indeed correct that the bilateral imbalance 
widened instead of narrowing in this period, from a deficit of 
$203 billion in 2005 to $268 billion in 2008 (BEA 2010). 
However,  this  interpretation  would  ignore  two  important 
considerations: the time lag for the exchange rate signal to affect 
the outcome, and any adverse time trend in the bilateral balance 
that could have been expected in the absence of any exchange 
rate change.
Figure 2 shows the path of the US bilateral trade balance 
with China, as a percent of US GDP, against the lagged real 
effective exchange rate of the renminbi (multilateral), desig-
nated REERL.9 Once again the lagged rate is the average of 
the  previous  two  years  for  the  real  effective  exchange  rate.
In  addition,  the  figure  shows  the  corresponding  lagged  real 
exchange rate of the renminbi against the US dollar (RB*L), 
deflating by consumer prices on both sides. The strong decline 
in the real bilateral renminbi against the dollar from 1999 in 
the figure (average of 1997–98) to 2004 (average of 2002–03) 
despite  a  constant  nominal  exchange  rate  of  8.28  yuan  per 
9. US-China trade data are from BEA (2010). 
dollar in this period was the result of low inflation in China 
(yearly average of 0.27 percent) and moderate inflation in the 
United States (2.3 percent). Once again the pattern is strongly 
suggestive  of  a  fairly  close  (this  time  positive)  relationship 
between the bilateral balance and the real exchange rate of the 
renminbi, whether multilateral or bilateral, but with a relatively 
strong downward time trend.
Once again regression tests confirm the presence of a rela-
tionship for the real exchange rate. First, using the multilateral 
real effective exchange rate lagged:
(2) B = –4.55 + 0.0343 REERL + 0.0446 GDIF –0.129 T; 
      (–8.2)     (6.9)                 (2.4)                   (–8.9)
adj. R2 = 0.986
where B is the US bilateral balance with China as a percent 
of US GDP, REERL as before is China’s lagged real effective 
(multilateral)  exchange  rate  index  (average  of  previous  two 
years), GDIF is China’s growth rate minus the US growth rate, 
and T is the time trend. There is an extremely high degree of 
explanation, and all of the coefficients are statistically significant 
and have the correct signs. The coefficient of China’s (lagged) 
real effective exchange rate on the bilateral US trade balance 
with China indicates that a 10 percent real effective apprecia-
tion of the renminbi is found to cause a reduction in the bilateral 
US deficit by 0.37 percent of US GDP, or $54 billion at 2010 
Figure 2     US-China bilateral trade balance as percent 
  of US GDP and lagged real effective  
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levels.10  The  coefficient  on  the  growth  differential  indicates 
that an increase of 1 percentage point in the excess of China’s 
growth rate over that of the United States increases the US 
bilateral trade balance with China by 0.045 percent of GDP, 
or $6.6 billion.
Using  the  bilateral  lagged  real  exchange  rate  instead,   
the best result is in the form of change from previous year. This 
test yields:
(3) dB = –0.127 + 0.0282 dRB*L percent + 0.0452 dGDIF;  
        (–3.7)      (3.5)               (2.1)
adj. R2 = 0.62
where dB is the change from the previous year in the bilateral 
balance as a percent of US GDP, dRB*L percent is the percentage 
change in the lagged bilateral real exchange rate, and dGDIF 
is the change from the previous year in the growth differen-
tial variable. This time the estimated coefficient shows that a   
10 percent change in the lagged bilateral real exchange rate 
causes a change in the bilateral trade balance of 0.282 percent 
of GDP, or $41 billion. A change of 1 percentage point in the 
growth differential once again improves the US bilateral balance 
by 0.0452 percent of GDP, or $6.6 billion.
The tests in equations 2 and 3 thus find a stronger impact 
of  renminbi  appreciation  on  the  US  bilateral  balance  with 
China than is found for the overall US balance either using the 
US REER impact parameter from Cline (2008) or using the 
US share in the impact for China indicated by equation 1. The 
range of the four estimates, for a 10 percent appreciation of the 
renminbi, is from $22 billion (US REER basis) to $38 billion 
(equation 1 basis), $54 billion (equation 2 basis), or $41 billion 
(equation 3). The proper treatment of exchange rate lags as well 
as the time trend is important in identifying these effects in 
equations 1–3) here.
The adverse time trend in equation 2, and the adverse 
time  trend  indicated  by  the  constant  term  in  equation  3, 
are  also  broadly  consistent  with  the  results  in  equation  1, 
but larger than might be expected. Thus, the time trend of 
about 0.8 percent of GDP per year for China’s rising current 
account surplus (equation 1), combined with a 0.15 share of 
the United States in China’s trade, would predict an adverse 
bilateral trend for the United States that amounts to 0.785 x 
0.15 x (5.6/14.8) = 0.045 percent of GDP, or $6.6 billion per 
year. In comparison, the bilateral test in equation 2 indicates 
an adverse time trend of 0.129 percent of GDP, or $19 billion. 
10. Again because the average of the exchange rate index in the period 
1998–2007 is 107.7, the magnitude of the regression coefficient needs to be 
increased by the factor 1.077 to arrive at the impact corresponding to a 1 per-
cent rise in the real effective exchange rate (1.077 x 0.0343 = 0.037). 
Because equation 3 is in the form of changes from the previous 
year, the corresponding time trend coefficient is the constant, 
almost identical at –0.127. Because the bilateral tests yield 
about three times as large an adverse time trend as obtained 
when applying the US trade share to China’s corresponding 
multilateral time trend, the question arises whether there is 
some reason that a general Balassa-Samuelson effect for China 
might be expected to be disproportionately focused on trade 
with the United States.
satellIte currencIes
The effect on the overall (multilateral) US trade balance could 
be larger if some “satellite” currencies of economies that are close 
regional trading partners of China were to move along with the 
adjustment in the renminbi. Figure 3 suggests that this effect 
of induced movement in regional currencies has in fact been 
present. From mid-2005 to mid-2008, Malaysia and Singapore 
moved their exchange rates against the dollar by virtually the 
same  proportion  as  China.  For  its  part, Taiwan  appreciated 
only about one-fourth as much (about 5 percent instead of 
about 20 percent). In contrast, another key regional partner of 
China’s—Hong Kong special administrative region (SAR)—did 
not change its exchange rate against the dollar at all, because it 
has followed a dollar-based currency board regime. 
The  increment  to  the  US  trade  balance  from  induced 
appreciation of these satellite currencies can be calculated in 
two alternative ways: from the standpoint of the effect on the 
US REER, and from the standpoint of the US share in the trade 
Figure 3     Currency strength against the US dollar 
  in 2005–08: China, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
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impact of the change in the other countries’ REERs. Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Taiwan have weights in US trade of 1.5 percent, 
1.8 percent, and 2.2 percent, respectively. Appreciations of 10 
percent, 10 percent, and 2.5 percent respectively by these three 
currencies would translate to an effective depreciation of 0.385 
percent for the US dollar. Applying the US current account 
impact parameter, the result would be a reduction in the US 
external deficit by 0.062 percent of GDP, or by $9 billion.
For the approach based on the US share in the impacts 
on other countries, the increment for the US would amount 
to $0.8 billion from Singapore, $1.1 billion from Malaysia, 
and nothing from Taiwan.11 So incorporation of the satellite 
currency effect would boost the estimated US effect by a range 
of about $2 billion to $9 billion. 
Nonetheless, it will remain to be seen whether a signifi-
cant rise in the renminbi following the recent return to more 
flexibility, if such a rise does occur, will be followed by compa-
rable increases in the currencies of Malaysia, Singapore, and 
even a partial rise for Taiwan. As can be seen in figure 3, when 
the global financial crisis entered a severe phase in the third 
11. Based on the current account impact parameters for Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, combined with the US share in their trade (see Cline 2008).  
The calculation is: ΔTBUS = –∑ ΔRi giYifi where ΔTBUS is the change in the 
US trade balance, ΔR is the proportionate change in the real effective 
exchange rate, g is the current account impact parameter, Y is GDP, f is the 
US trade share, and subscript i refers to the country in question. If China, Sin-
gapore, and Malaysia all appreciate 10 percent against the dollar and Taiwan 
appreciates by 2.5 percent, the result is an effective appreciation of 7.6 percent 
for Singapore and 6.9 percent for Malaysia (considerably less than 10 percent 
because of their large trade shares with each other, especially Malaysia and 
Singapore). For Taiwan the result is an effective depreciation of 0.6 percent, 
because the appreciation of its largest trading partner China outweighs its 
small depreciation against the dollar. (Note also that with these appreciations 
by these three trading partners, the 10 percent appreciation of the renminbi 
against the dollar would translate to a modestly smaller effective appreciation 
of 9.4 percent for China.)
quarter of 2008, these regional partners decoupled from the 
renminbi and allowed their currencies to depreciate substan-
tially. So magnification of renminbi effects through lock-step 
parallel currency movements by regional partners cannot be 
taken for granted.
conclusIon 
In sum, a simple statistical test provides empirical support to 
the view that China’s exchange rate does matter importantly 
for China’s current account balance. Other tests show that the 
strength of the renminbi also matters for the bilateral trade 
balance between the United States and China. For China, a rise 
of 1 percent in the real effective exchange rate causes a reduction 
in the current account surplus by 0.30 percent of GDP (Cline 
2008) to 0.45 percent of GDP (equation 1). At 2010 scale, a   
10  percent  real  effective  appreciation  would  reduce  China’s 
current account surplus by about $170 billion to $250 billion. 
For the United States, the corresponding improvement in the 
current account balance would range from a low estimate of 
$22 billion (US REER basis without satellite currency effects) 
to a high of $63 billion (equation 2 bilateral basis plus high 
end of the range of satellite currency effects).12 Decisions on 
China’s exchange rate policy thus do matter for the objective 
of reducing international imbalances, rather than being irrel-
evant because of supposed structural peculiarities that cause the 
exchange rate to have no impact on either China’s global trade 
or its bilateral trade with the United States.
  At the same time, the positive time trend for China’s 
current account surplus and negative trend for the US bilateral 
balance (coefficients on the time variable T in equations 1 and 
2, and constant term in equation 3) suggest that adjustment 
accomplished  by  exchange  rate  correction  alone  will  tend, 
over time, to be gradually reversed unless there is a sequence 
of  successive  appreciations  of  the  renminbi.  Other  factors, 
and in particular special Chinese efforts to shift the economy 
away from external demand and toward domestic demand, 
are by implication important complements of exchange rate 
adjustment.  In  the  absence  of  such  efforts,  the  long-term 
trend  toward  a  rising  trade  surplus  would  tend  to  cause 
growing excess demand and rising inflationary pressures on 
the economy.
12. Equation 3 confirms a significant exchange rate effect on the bilateral 
balance when using the bilateral real renminbi-dollar rate rather than China’s 
real effective exchange rate, with the high estimate including satellite currency 
effects at $50 billion for a 10 percent rise in the renminbi.
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